Big Little Lies: როგორ იქმნება ანტიევროპული ნარატივები საქართველოში

 

Big Little Numbers: The Numbers Don't Believe Lavrov's Tears

June 30, 2026

In my first blog post, I examined the propaganda methods Russia uses against Georgia. In this second blog, I'll prove with numbers just how false the statements being spread by Lavrov, as well as by Kobakhidze, Papuashvili, and other Russian-aligned propagandists, are.

Lavrov is shedding crocodile tears, claiming that the EU will destroy Georgian agriculture. Papuashvili is tearing his hair out too, insisting that EU membership will wreck the wine sector. All these statements share one common feature: they're never backed by numbers, or verifiable facts. Just fear — “destruction,” “collapse,” “the end.”

I'm an economist by training, I've worked with statistics, and numbers make it easier for me to show the truth. Before we get to the numbers, let me say this: we don't want to be Russia's potbellied, wine-glass-toting cheerleaders — a country hanging entirely off a single market, one that can be brought to its knees by a single phone call. We want Europe. We want a high-tech, competitive, sturdy agricultural sector — like the one the Baltic states and Poland have built.

Now, the numbers. Lots of them.

Chapter I: How Poland's and the Baltic States' Agro Sector Cashed In

Lavrov says the EU destroys agriculture. So where is even one country that lost its agricultural sector after joining the EU? There is no answer. Instead, there's the Polish agricultural miracle.

Poland: From Food Importer to Europe's Food Export Powerhouse

Before 2004 — before EU accession — Poland imported more food than it exported. After 2004, the picture flipped entirely: total agro exports grew from €5 billion to €58.4 billion, nearly a 12-fold increase. 2025 was a record year, up 8.6% on the previous year.

The apple sector is the most visible example. Today, one in every three apples in Europe comes from Poland. Poland ranks 4th in the world in apple production, after China, Turkey, and the US. In 2025, Poland exported over 600,000 tons of apples. Is this the country where “agriculture was destroyed”?

              Source: Eurostat

The Baltic States: Three Countries, Three Success Stories

The Baltic states, which — like Georgia — were once part of the Soviet Union, joined the EU in 2004. These numbers need no commentary:

Lithuania: GDP per capita rose from $4,700 to $29,400 (a reminder: this figure is roughly three times lower in Georgia today). Dairy products are exported to over 60 countries, with exports making up 60% of the sector's revenue. The country received over €17 billion from the EU's rural development fund (mostly grants and co-financing).

Latvia: GDP per capita rose from $4,100 to $23,400; the average annual income of a farmer grew from €1,000 to €5,100. The country received €10 billion from EU funds.

Estonia: GDP per capita rose from $4,500 to $31,400. Agricultural digitalization exceeds 70%, and monitoring in the dairy industry reaches 95% — one of the highest rates in the world. The country received €8 billion from EU funds.

Estonia is particularly striking. This small country became a leader in Europe's digital transformation of agriculture. The Estonian farm-management startup eAgronom now manages 700,000 hectares across 9 countries.

                    Source: World Bank, EC DG AGRI

                 Source: World Bank

Chapter II: Armenia's Embargo — Déjà Vu for Georgia

In 2005, against the backdrop of Georgia's drive toward NATO and the EU, Moscow launched economic reprisals. In March 2006, Russia “discovered” sanitary violations in Georgian wine. That same year, “problems” turned up in Borjomi mineral water and Georgian fruits and vegetables. Before the embargo, 87% of Georgian wine exports went to Russia. Overnight, that market vanished. And how can we not recall Papuashvili's 2024 fake-news claim that EU accession would destroy Georgian wine?

2006–2013: The Russian Embargo That Walked Georgian Wine Into Europe

The embargo hit Georgian winemakers hard. But every cloud has a silver lining — they were forced to find new markets and improve the quality of their wine, since, unlike Russia, Western markets don't buy semi-sweet red wine or low-quality, sulfur-heavy whites. By 2013, the share of new markets in total exports had grown to 10.9%. Georgian wine appeared in Poland, Germany, the Baltics, China, Japan, the US...

Source: Geostat, National Wine Agency

After 2013: A Lesson Forgotten All Over Again

In 2013, Russia reopened its doors. Naturally, Georgian winemakers returned to that market, and little by little, found themselves back in the pre-2005 situation. In 2025, 64% of Georgian wine exports once again went to Russia. Total wine exports in 2025 reached $268 million, of which $171 million went to Russia. Notably, in 2025, Georgia became Russia's top wine import partner, with a 26% share.

It's worth comparing the export price per liter of wine: $2.74 in Russia, $6.20 in the US, $5.82 in Japan, and $5.10 in the UK. In other words, we sell the cheapest to the least reliable buyer.

Meanwhile, Georgian wine exports to the EU have barely changed over the past decade, hovering at 10–13% of total exports, though volume has grown from 7 to 11.5 million liters. Wine exports go mainly to Poland, Germany, and the Baltic states.

                      Source: National Wine Agency, Wine Intelligence

                 Source: Geostat

2026: Same Script, This Time in Armenia

After Armenia declared its pro-European integration policy in 2025, Moscow's reaction came swiftly, with the exact same playbook used against Georgia in 2005–2006. Citing “sanitary violations,” Russia announced an embargo on flowers on May 22, 2026; on Armenian wine and cognac on May 25; on Jermuk mineral water on May 29; on tomatoes, cucumbers, and peppers on May 30; and in June, a full embargo on fruit, vegetables, grain, and timber. Armenian cognac, just like Georgian wine in 2005, was catastrophically dependent on the single Russian market, which accounted for over 50% of its total exports.

                Source: Meduza, The Moscow Times

A Wise Person Learns from Others' Mistakes (A Foolish One Doesn't)

Armenia now needs to do exactly what Georgia managed to do between 2006 and 2013: improve product quality and diversify exports. And Armenia actually has a head start compared to Georgia. Specifically, after the Russian embargo, the European Commission provided Armenia with a range of technical assistance to export its products — something that didn't happen for Georgia in 2006.

Chapter III: Kobakhidze Picks Up Lavrov's Baton

On June 26, 2026, following Lavrov's lie about agricultural “destruction,” Irakli Kobakhidze threw in a brand-new whopper of his own. Specifically, in his annual report to Parliament, he stated:

“There is no direct correlation between EU accession and economic growth. Our nominal economy has grown roughly 20-fold since 2003.”

Tellingly, this claim was picked up and translated into English within hours — not by independent Georgian or international media, but by Sputnik/Pravda, a Russian state-aligned propaganda outlet.

 

Lie Number One: “20-Fold”

This figure is easy to check. According to Georgia's Ministry of Finance and Geostat, Georgia's nominal GDP in 2003 was about 8.6 billion GEL. In 2025, it was 95 billion GEL. That's an 11-fold increase, not 20-fold. In dollar terms, the growth is even smaller — 7–8 times.

                         Source: Geostat, Ministry of Finance

Lie Number Two: “There's No Correlation”

Kobakhidze is comparing Georgia's percentage growth to that of EU countries — a classic statistical sleight of hand based on the “low base effect.” In 2003, Georgia's GDP per capita was only $945, while the Baltic states' stood at $4,000–7,000. Growing from ten to twenty is a 100% increase, while growing from one thousand to one thousand five hundred is only a 50% increase. But which one is actually richer?

The correct method here is to use GDP per capita PPP — a measure that accounts for price levels and real purchasing power across countries, and reflects actual living standards. By this method, the Pearson correlation coefficient between EU membership and GDP per capita PPP is r = +0.89.

What does r = +0.89 mean? In simple terms: the correlation coefficient ranges from -1 to +1, and the closer it is to +1, the stronger the relationship between the variables. So r = +0.89 indicates a very strong positive relationship between EU membership and prosperity.

Understanding the correlation coefficient has never been this simple:

As for catching up with EU countries: according to World Bank calculations, Georgia's GDP per capita PPP stood at $20,100 in 2024. That means a citizen of any recently-joined EU country is far wealthier than a Georgian — Bulgaria $33,400, Romania $40,100, Croatia $43,200. Clearly, the Georgian government has nothing to boast about on this front.

             Source: World Bank

Conclusion

In this blog, I tried to answer three questions.

First — does the EU destroy agriculture? Poland's exports grew 12-fold. The Baltic states became three to four times richer. One in three apples in Europe is Polish. Is this “destruction”?

Second — who is actually destroying Georgian wine? The EU has never embargoed Georgian wine. Russia did. And now it's doing the exact same thing to Armenia, citing the exact same “sanitary” pretext.

Third — is there a link between EU membership and economic prosperity? Kobakhidze says no. The Pearson coefficient says r = +0.89. In other words — yes, and it's a very strong one.

On all three questions, Lavrov, Papuashvili, and Kobakhidze stand on the same side — and the numbers stand firmly on the opposite one.